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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
Some states, including Massachusetts and California, have by statute com-
bined the three crimes into one for purposes of indictment. A similar stat-
ute would be welcome in Missouri. See (1920) 20 Colo. L. Rev. 318, and 484,
490a California Penal Code 1931, also People v. Stevenson (1930) 103 Cal.
App. 82, 284 P. 487. J. C. L. '36.
EVmENC--HEARSAY-LEARNED TREATISES.-The defendant company main-
tained its wires carrying 13,000 volts, at a height nineteen feet and four
inches above a rural road. Plaintiff's intestate was electrocuted when a
twenty-two foot iron pole he was erecting came in contact with the high
power line. The defendant assigned as error the exclusion as evidence of
the "National Electric Code" issued in 1926 by the United States Depart-
ment of Commerce, Bureau of Standards, which showed that, for wires
carrying 750 to 15,000 volts, the vertical minimum clearance along roads
in rural districts should be eighteen feet. This book was issued to inform
the public, but no law required it. Held; that the book deals not with an
exact science, nor mathematical or factual certainties, but with a contro-
versial and developing science in which opinions may vary and experience
work great changes, and is therefore excluded, just as medical books are,
from the evidence. Mississippi Power and Light Co. v. Whitescraver (C. C. A.
5, 1934) 68 F. (2d) 928.
This decision is of more than passing interest since it determines a point
which, heretofore, seems to have been unsettled in the federal courts, and
thus falls in line with the overwhelming weight of authority which holds
that scientific books are not exceptions to the hearsay rule and must be ex-
cluded. Ashworth v. Kittridge (1853) 12 Cush. (Mass.) 193, 59 Am. Dec.
178; People v. Vanderhoof (1888) 71 Mich. 179, 39 N. W. 28; Whiteley v.
Stien (S. C. Mo. 1931) 34 S. W. (2d) 1001; 3 Wigmore (2d ed., 1923) par.
1696; 10 R. C. L., Evidence, sec. 364. The courts offer varied reasons for
their position. A Missouri court says that such a learned treatise represents
a statement out of court by one not present for cross examination. Whitely
v. Stien, supra. Others say that scientists disagree among themselves and
thus such evidence is not trustworthy. Ashworth v. Kittridge, supra; Hoff-
man v. Click (1877) 77 N. C. 57. Passages from a book may not convey the
author's complete view, Gallager v. Market St. R. Co. (1885) 67 Cal. 16,
6 Pac. 869, and may confuse the jury without oral simplication, Ashworth
v. Kittridge, supra. Alabama, despite the elsewhere unanimous opinion to
the contrary, has continually admitted scientific works as evidence, Stouden-
meier v. Wilson (1857) 29 Ala. 568; Bales v. State (1879) 63 Ala. 38;
Birmingham R. L. and P. Co. v. Moore (1906) 148 Ala. 115, 42 So. 1024,
arguing that all expert testimony is based in some part on written authorities,
and therefore the admission of books is in fact the admission of primary
evidence. Stoudenmeier v. Williamson, supra, 1. c. 567. Several states, for
this reason, have attempted to escape the limitations of the common law
with regard to the exclusion of scientific books as evidence, by statutory en-
actment designing them to be an exception to the hearsay rule. Cal. C. C. P.
1931, sec. 1936; Idaho Comp. St. 1919, sec. 7961; Iowa Rev. Code, sec. 7325;
Nebr. Rev. St. 1922, sec. 8852; Mont. Rev. Code 1921, sec. 10575; Ore. Laws
1920, sec. 781; 3 Wigmore (2d ed., 1923) par. 1693. In California, Iowa,
and Nebraska, however, the effort of the legislature has been negatived by
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the courts which have limited the introduction of scientific material to mat-
ters of "general interest." Gallager v. Market St. R. Co., supra; Burg v.
Chi. R. L & P. R. Co. (1894) 90 Iowa 106, 57 N. W. 680; Van Skike v. Potter
(1897) 53 Nebr. 28, 73 N. W. 295, thereby refusing to admit learned treatises
as such.
However, in spite of the general rule, or, perhaps, because of it, the books
indicate many instances in which scientific works are admissible evidence.
Tables of mortality, Joliet v. Blower (1895) 155 Ill. 414, 50 N. W. 619,
dictionaries, Nix v. Heddon (1893) 149 U. S. 304, histories, Charlotte v.
Cholean (1856) 33 Mo. 194, may be introduced, since they represent exact
sciences or matters of general interest. In a few jurisdictions an expert
witness may cite writers in his profession as corroborating his views. Pumey
v. Cahill (1882) 48 Mich. 586, 12 N. W. 862; Scott v. Astoria R. Co. (Ore.
1903) 72 Pac. 594. Likewise, others allow counsel on cross examination to
read a professional treatise as opposing the statement of an expert. State v.
Wood (1873) 53 N. H. 495; Louisville R. Co. v. Howell (1896) 147 Ind. 266.
Kansas allows counsel to read learned treatises to the jury. State v. O'Neil
(1893) 51 Kan. 651, 33 Pac. 287. In Missouri such practice is permitted in
the discretion of the trial court. State v. Soper (1899) 148 Mo. 217, 49
S. W. 1007. It is common for a court to cite medical works and the like in
support of its decision. Steenerson v. Great North. R. Co. (1897) 69 Minn.
353, 72 N. W. 713 (London Economist, Bankers Magazine, cited); Sumatt v.
Colombet (1895) 107 Cal. 187,40 Pac. 329 (citing Sonnenschen's Cyc. of Ed.).
The honors for such judicial hypocrisy would seem to go to the court which
cited in its opinion the scientific books it rejected from the evidence. Wash-
burn v. Cuddihy (Mass. 1857) 8 Gray 431.
The decisions among the federal courts on this subject are confusing, if not
conflicting. The reason for this can be attributed to a dictum in Davis V.
U. S. (1897) 165 U. S. 373, which went farther than the facts in the case
required and declared that books of science should not be admitted as evi-
dence. Some federal courts have followed this dictum, regarding it as a
rule of procedure. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Amman (C. C. A. 3, 1924)
296 F. 453; Du Pont v. White (C. C. A. 3, 1925) 8 F. (2d) 5; Mutual Life Ins.
Co. of N. Y. v. Savage (C. C. A. 5, 1929) 31 F. (2d) 35. There remains
another federal decision which was decided after Davis v. U. S., supra, and
which permitted to be read as evidence a pamphlet prepared by the U. S.
Dept. of Agriculture, and also "Kent's Mechanical Engineer's Pocketbook."
Western Assur. Co. v. Mohlman (C. C. A. 2, 1897) 83 F. 811. Although this
case is not authority for the admissibility of medical books as such, it per-
mitted the introduction of a governmental pamphlet, since, as says the court,
"Records of observations are undoubtedly secondary evidence, but if all such
records were excluded from the sources of knowledge available to a court of
justice, it would frequently find itself closed to information which was open
to every individual in the community." The principal case ignored this
plea in deciding that an official pamphlet of the Dept. of Commerce was
similar to a medical book and therefore inadmissible. The earlier case de-
cided to the contrary.
It is submitted that the instant case is following blindly a rule of law which
has no place in our present system. Learned treaties deserve to be accepted
in evidence on the following grounds, (1) necessity, since the author usually
is not available, (2) trustworthiness, the author has no reason or motive to
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misrepresent, (3) accuracy, due to the care with which such treatises are
written. In any event, "it must be admitted that those who write with no
view to litigation are at least as trustworthy, though unsworn and unex-
amined, as perhaps the greater portion of those who take the stand for a
fee from one of the litigants." 3 Wigmore (2d ed., 1923) par. 1692.
H. A. G. '35.
INSURANCE-ENGAGED IN AERONAUTICS-OCCASIONAL PASSENGEns.-Judi-
cial construction of exception clauses relating to aviation in life and accident
insurance policies is still a matter of doubt despite numerous decisions.
Where insured, passenger in an airplane, was killed as a result of the fall-
ing of the machine, and plaintiff sued on two life insurance policies provid-
ing for double indemnity for accidental death, held: the death resulted from
"engaging, as a passenger or otherwise, in submarine or aeronautic opera-
tions" within an exception in the double indemnity clause. Goldsmith v. New
York Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1934) 69 F. (2d) 273.
Where the insurance contract denies liability if the injuries resulted from
"participating in aeronautics," aviation or the like, cases are uniform in
stating that a passenger in an airplane, commercial or otherwise, cannot
recover. Bew v. Traveler's Ins. Co. (1921) 95 N. J. L. 533, 112 Atl. 859;
Pittman et al. v. Lamar Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 5, 1927) 17 F. (2d) 370,
certiorari denied 274 U. S. 750; Head et al. v. New York Life Ins. Co.
(C. C. A. 10, 1930) 43 F. (2d) 517; First National Bank of Chattanooga v.
Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1933) 62 F. (2d) 681; Traveler's
Ins. Co. v. Peake (1921) 82 Fla. 128, 89 So. 418; Meredith v. Business Men's
Accident Assoc. (1923) 213 Mo. App. 688, 252 S. W. 976; Vance, Insurance
(2d ed. 1930) 902. But if the clause reads "engaged in aeronautics" or its
equivalent Courts have generally been moved to construe the policy more
strictly against the insuror and hold the occasional passenger without the
exception on the ground that "engaged" involves an element of continuity,
of active employment or occupation, and does not relate to a single act.
Benefit Association of By. Employees v. Hayden (1927) 175 Ark. 565, 299
S. W. 995; Masonic Accident Ins. Co. v. Jackson (1929) 200 Ind. 472, 164
N. E. 628, overruling 147 N. E. 156; Peters v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America
(1929) 133 Misc. Rep. 780, 233 N. Y. Supp. 500; Gits v. New York Life
Ins. Co. (C. C. A. 7,1929) 32 F. (2d) 7; Price v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1929) 98
Fla. 1044, 124 So. 817; Flanders v. Benefit Association of By. Employees
(1931) 226 Mo. App. 143, 42 S. W. (2d) 973; Charette v. Prudential Ins. Co.
(1930) 202 Wis. 470, 232 N. W. 848; see also Stone, J., dissenting in the
present case.
So far there seems to be little difficulty in interpretation, but when the
wording of the policy is varied, as in the present case, the problem of the
judges is greatly increased. If the word "operations" is added to "engaged
in aviation" there is an even stronger indication of a continuous occupational
relation, and the scope of the exception to the insuror's liability is further
narrowed. Gits v. New York Life Ins. Co., and First National Bank of
Chattanooga v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra. "As a passenger or
otherwise" has been present in several policies which have been the sub-
ject of judicial consideration beside the one under discussion, and it has been
accepted as evidence of an intention on the part of the insuror to exclude
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